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Biometric Boom: How the Private Sector
Commodifies Human Characteristics
Elizabeth M. Walker*
Biometric technology has become an increasingly common part of
daily life. Although biometrics have been used for decades, recent advances and new uses have made the technology more prevalent, particularly in the private sector. This Note examines how widespread use of
biometrics by the private sector is commodifying human characteristics.
As the use of biometrics has become more extensive, it exacerbates and
exposes individuals and industry to a number of risks and problems associated with biometrics. Despite public belief, biometric systems may be
bypassed, hacked, or even fail. The more a characteristic is utilized, the
less value it will hold for security purposes. Once compromised, a biometric cannot be replaced as would a password or other security device.
This Note argues that there are strong justifications for a legal structure that builds hurdles to slow the adoption of biometrics in the private
sector. By examining the law and economics and personality theories of
commodification, this Note identifies market failure and potential harm
to personhood due to biometrics. The competing theories justify a reform
to protect human characteristics from commodification. This Note
presents a set of principles and tools based on defaults, disclosures, incentives, and taxation to discourage use of biometrics, buying time to strengthen the technology, educate the public, and establish legal safeguards for
when the technology is compromised or fails.
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INTRODUCTION
On any given afternoon, a person shops at a grocery store,
withdraws money from an ATM, and checks her smartphone a
dozen times. Except she performs these tasks with a biometric: the
grocery store implemented a system to pay with a fingerprint, the
bank’s ATM requires a fingerprint instead of a PIN, and a fingerprint unlocks the screen of her smartphone. These uses of fingerprints are enormously convenient, and perhaps the individual feels
more secure because her accounts are protected by something that
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is attached to her body. But how many other things did she touch
that day? Probably door handles, coffee cups, light switches, tables,
books, and countless other things. Does that mean she left her
“password” or “key” on all these items? Suppose her bank notifies her that it suffered a data breach. How does she change her fingerprint?
Fingerprints are merely a type of biometric. The term biometrics is often used interchangeably to describe a characteristic or a
method.1 As a characteristic, biometrics means measurable physiological or behavioral characteristics of a person that may be used
for recognition.2 Measurable physiological characteristics include
fingerprints, face, iris, retina, and hand geometry; examples of
measurable behavioral characteristics are voice, keystroke, signature, and gait.3 As a method, biometrics means the process of automated recognition based on a person’s measurable characteristic.4 Biometric systems essentially make the human body “machine-readable.”5
Scholarly analysis of biometrics generally relates to government
uses, such as national security and surveillance.6 However, this
1

See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING § 31:1 (2013). This Note primarily uses “biometrics” to refer to human
measurable characteristics and uses “biometric system” when discussing the recognition
process.
2
See NSTC SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, BIOMETRICS “FOUNDATION DOCUMENTS” 1
(2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/biofoundationdocs.pdf
[hereinafter Foundation Documents].
3
See Ishwar K. Sethi, Biometrics: Overview and Applications, in PRIVACY AND
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 117, 117 (Katherine
J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006). There is some debate as to whether DNA
is a biometric because DNA recognition is not currently automated. See Foundation
Documents, supra note 2, at 21.
4
See Foundation Documents, supra note 2, at 1.
5
See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in
Biometric Technology, 00720/12/EN, WP 193, at 4 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2012/wp193_en.pdf [hereinafter WP 193].
6
See, e.g., Lauren D. Adkins, Biometrics: Weighing Convenience and National Security
Against Your Privacy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 541 (2007); Laura K.
Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012); Margaret Hu, Biometric ID
Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 (2013); Rudy Ng, Catching Up To Our Biometric

834

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:831

Note examines the rapidly expanding use of biometrics by the private sector. Does extensive use across industries accelerate the
transformation of nonsalable attributes into market goods? For
what purposes is it justified to use something so closely associated
with oneself? This Note claims that widespread use of biometrics
by the private sector is commodifying human characteristics and
exacerbating other risks and problems associated with biometrics.
Biometrics are not new. For decades, law enforcement has used
fingerprint analysis during criminal investigations.7 However, in
the last few decades, technology has helped to automate the
process and allow more human characteristics to be utilized for
recognition.8 These technological advancements, coupled with
growing concerns for terrorism and cybersecurity, are propelling
the growth of biometric technology.9 Biometrics offer a number of
advantages over other security systems. The characteristics are
well-suited as identifiers because they are unique to each individual.10 Also, biometric identifiers are convenient; because humans
carry the characteristic on their body at all times and it cannot be
forgotten, biometrics eliminate the need to remember PINs and
passwords or to carry identification documents.11
However, this Note demonstrates that the private sector’s use
of biometrics raises significant privacy and security concerns. Privacy is about power over information, determining who should
access and use information.12 Companies are beginning to collect
Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 425 (2006).
7
See Donohue, supra note 6, at 418–19; NANCY YUE LIU, BIO-PRIVACY: PRIVACY
REGULATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIOMETRICS 4 (2012).
8
See Foundation Documents, supra note 2, at 7; LIU, supra note 7, at 10–11.
9
See LIU, supra note 7, at 3.
10
See Robyn Moo-Young, “Eyeing” the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric
Authentication, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 422 (2001). It should be noted that biometrics
are not truly universal as some individuals may not have a specific characteristic due to
disease, birth defects, or other causes, which could lead to discrimination as biometric
systems are more widely implemented. See LIU, supra note 7, at 68.
11
See Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric
Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 662 (2003); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 201 (2011).
12
See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667,
673 (2013).
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biometrics in exchange for something else or without an individual’s knowledge. Because biometrics are easily obtained, individuals
are left powerless over the collection and use of their characteristics. Similarly, if an individual is left with a binary choice of whether to provide biometrics or forgo a product, the collector has all the
power in the transaction.
Security, on the other hand, determines who can actually
access and use information; it implements the privacy choices.13
Biometrics are being used as a security measure; attributes are protecting other personal information. Most individuals believe that
biometrics systems are accurate and secure. However, this Note
demonstrates the alarming number of flaws in biometric systems,
such as the countless ways in which biometrics can be hacked and
compromised. Further, a significant risk with biometrics is that
they are irreplaceable. Reliance is rapidly being placed on human
attributes that cannot be changed. In a world where data breaches
are common occurrences, individuals should be prepared to change
passwords and other security measures frequently. The numerous
risks associated with biometrics are accentuated as the technology
becomes more prevalent.
This Note argues that widespread use, propelled by the private
sector, causes more parties to be interested in biometrics. As more
biometric systems are implemented, unique human characteristics
become more commonplace, heightening concerns for irreplaceability and security. This Note demonstrates that competing theories of commodification justify reform to protect biometrics. The
law and economics approach, which places all things in the free
market, allows intervention when faced with an inefficient market.
Extensive evidence demonstrates that the nature of privacy, biometrics, and human cognition result in market failure. A similar conclusion is reached when biometrics are analyzed under Margaret
Radin’s personality theory, where personal attributes are too personal to be monetized. Rather, the noncommodified version of
biometrics fosters personhood and improves social interactions.
This Note concludes that there are strong justifications for a legal structure that builds hurdles to slow the adoption of biometrics
13

See id. at 676–78.
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in the private sector. Based on choice architecture, this Note
presents a system of defaults, disclosures, and incentives to push
the private sector, and individuals, away from utilizing biometrics.
There is no way to prevent the use of biometrics altogether, but
forcing companies and individuals to slow down will give society
time to consider the risks, fortify security, and build safeguards for
when the technology is compromised or fails. The proposed principles and set of tools are consistent with the self-regulation and
limited government regulation traditions of the United States.
Part I explains how biometric technology operates and how the
private sector is using biometrics. The discussion assesses the security vulnerabilities and serious risks of using biometrics. Part II
explores competing theoretical views of commodification and concludes that due to the nature of biometrics and problems with privacy, intervention and reform are needed to govern biometrics.
Part III describes available legal tools that may be applied to biometrics. The discussion suggests that current legal structures are inadequate to govern biometrics in the United States, but that a hybrid solution may be more effective. Part IV proposes a set of principles to guide collection, use, and storage of biometrics by the private sector. The proposal attempts to establish hurdles to slow the
adoption and discourage private entities and individuals from utilizing biometrics.
I. BIOMETRICS OVERVIEW
This Part provides an overview of biometric technology. First,
there is an explanation of how the technology operates and its vulnerabilities. This Part also reviews the private sector’s growing list
of diverse biometric implementations. Finally, there is a discussion
of how the private sector’s rapid adoption is spurring the commodification of biometrics, which in turn is aggravating other problems associated with the technology.

2015]

BIOMETRIC BOOM

837

A. System Operation & Vulnerabilities
Biometric systems are pattern recognition systems most often
used to verify or identify an individual.14 The first phase of the
process is enrollment where an individual’s biometric characteristic is captured by a sensor device.15 The device extracts key features from the characteristic and produces a mathematical model
called a template.16 The system predetermines which features it
will extract and use for matching, and the templates only encode
those extracted features.17
The second phase is either verification or identification.18 An
individual presents her characteristic to the device and the system
conducts a search to match the presented characteristic against existing templates.19 Matching results are based on statistical certainty that the presented characteristic and existing template are from
the same person.20 Verification, or “one-to-one” matching, is used
to confirm an individual; the system matches the presented characteristic against the individual’s claimed identity.21 Identification, or
“one-to-many” matching, is used to recognize an individual; the
system searches a database of stored templates to match the presented characteristic.22 The identification process depends on a
database of stored templates; however, verification may match
templates stored in a database or stored locally in a token or identification card.23
The benefit of biometric systems is that they are more secure
than other security measures currently available. Biometrics produce significantly longer data streams than any password a human

14

See Sethi, supra note 3, at 119; Stephen Hoffman, Biometrics, Retinal Scanning, and
the Right to Privacy in the 21st Century, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 38, 46 (2010).
15
See LIU, supra note 7, at 32.
16
See id.
17
See id. at 119–20.
18
See Sethi, supra note 3, at 120.
19
See id. at 120–21.
20
See LIU, supra note 7, at 33.
21
See Sethi, supra note 3, at 118.
22
See id.
23
See LIU, supra note 7, at 32.
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could recall.24 Long passwords are more secure against attacks than
shorter passwords.25 However, just because the technology is more
secure by comparison does not mean that it is secure in and of itself. The technology actually has a number of troubling vulnerabilities.26 One point of attack is faking—also called “spoofing”—the
characteristic.27 Studies have shown that biometric systems can be
bypassed with fake fingerprints and high resolution images of eyes
and faces.28 Another potential breach is through modifying the
template, which is based on a discrete number of features.29 Someone looking to bypass the system would only need to know the features the system uses and would not have to replicate the exact
characteristic.30 Finally, because a characteristic is saved as data, a
template may be decoded leaving biometric systems vulnerable to
hacking just like other password-based systems.31
A related concern is the ongoing cybersecurity arms race.32
Even as security measures become more advanced, hackers continue to find flaws, causing security to be repaired and further strengthened.33 This constant back-and-forth game means that hackers
are usually ahead of security experts.34 Technology will always be
24

See Nalini K. Ratha et al., An Analysis of Minutiae Matching Strength, in AUDIO- AND
VIDEO-BASED BIOMETRIC PERSON AUTHENTICATION: THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, AVBPA 2001 HALMSTAD, SWEDEN, JUNE 2001 PROCEEDINGS 225 (Springer
2001), available at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~rossarun/BiometricsTextBook/Papers/
Security/Ratha_MinaMatchingStrength_AVBPA01.pdf.
25
See id.
26
For a longer discussion on biometric system security and vulnerability, see Anil K.
Jain & Ajay Kumar, Biometric Recognition: An Overview, in SECOND GENERATION
BIOMETRICS: THE ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 49, 60–65 (Emilio Mordini &
Dimitros Tzovaras eds., 2012); Gang Wei & Dongge Li, Biometrics: Applications,
Challenges and the Future, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSSDISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 135, 142–45 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu
eds., 2006).
27
See Jain & Kumar, supra note 26, at 60–61.
28
See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 202; Sethi, supra note 3, at 131–32.
29
See Jain & Kumar, supra note 26, at 61.
30
See id.
31
See DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 204 (Lucy L. Thomson ed., 2011).
32
See Harry Bruinius, Feds Hacked: Is Cybersecurity a Bigger Threat Than Terrorism?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/
1110/Feds-hacked-Is-cybersecurity-a-bigger-threat-than-terrorism-video.
33
See id.
34
See id.
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vulnerable to sophisticated hackers.35 Even if biometrics are currently more secure than other security measures, that does not
mean that they will always be more secure.
There is also a common misconception that biometric systems
are precise. Rather, it is actually impossible for a biometric system
to be 100% accurate.36 The results are based on statistical certainty
and—by the nature of the technology—the system must accept
false positives and false negatives.37
These flaws are significant. The movement towards biometrics
is based on the belief that the systems are secure and accurate, two
arguments easily refuted. As the following section demonstrates,
biometrics are being rapidly adopted for a variety of uses. However,
in light of the technological vulnerabilities, it seems foolish that the
technology is being relied upon so heavily.
B. Expanding Uses
The government was an early adopter of biometric technology,
and its predominant use of the technology is for security purposes.
The Department of Homeland Security uses fingerprint scanning
and facial-recognition technology to record the identities of visitors
to the United States.38 Similarly, many states require fingerprint
scanning to confirm an individual’s identity before distributing welfare or unemployment benefits.39 Some public schools have even
begun allowing children to pay for lunch using their finger- or
handprint.40
However, the private sector has also begun implementing biometric systems. Without any restrictions on what can be collected
or how it may be used, industry is rapidly expanding the prevalence
of biometric systems. Security is the most common purpose for
which the private sector uses biometrics. Examples include Ap35

See id.
See Hu, supra note 6, at 1535.
37
See id.; LIU, supra note 7, at 33.
38
See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:38.
39
See id. § 31:43.
40
See School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money For Fingerprint Scans, CBS CHI. (July 2,
2014, 12:49 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/07/02/school-cafeterias-tradinglunch-money-for-fingerprint-scans/.
36
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ple’s Touch ID, which allows users to unlock their phones and tablets with a fingerprint;41 amusement parks, including Disney
World, require patrons to scan their fingerprints to use passes;42
some ATMs are equipped with fingerprint scanners;43 MasterCard
announced a fingerprint-enabled credit card;44 and some hospitals
are scanning patient hands in order to retrieve the correct medical
records.45 Recently, banks have begun storing and processing voice
samples of customers calling about their accounts to create a
“voiceprint.”46 The bank will use the voiceprint to verify the customer’s identity and prevent fraudsters from gaining access to an
account over the telephone.47
Companies are also beginning to explore other purposes for
biometric technology. A recent trend in biometric use is to provide
a value-add service based on individuals’ characteristics. Facebook
launched a feature that “tagged” individuals in uploaded images.48
The site collected and stored biometric information from millions
of users and utilized facial recognition technology to automatically
identify the individuals.49 Another example of a value-add use of
biometrics is Google Audio History.50 This opt-in service retains
recordings of voice searches or commands so the company can
learn the sound of an individual’s voice and provide better results
when speech recognition products are used.51
41

See Use Touch ID on iPhone and iPad, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/enus/HT5883 (last modified Mar. 3, 2015).
42
SEE FINGER SCANNING AT THEME PARKS, MY FOX ORLANDO (MAY 9, 2012, 11:58
PM), http://www.myfoxorlando.com/story/18248551/finger-scanning-at-theme-parks.
43
See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:46.
44
See Darrell Etherington, MasterCard Will Borrow a Touch ID Trick for Fingerprint
Scanning Credit Card, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 17, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/
17/mastercard-will-borrow-a-touch-id-trick-for-fingerprint-scanning-credit-card/.
45
See Eliene Augenbraun, How Biometric Palm Scans Help Keep Hospitals Secure, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patientsecurebiometric-palm-scan-system-hospital-security/.
46
See Raphael Satter, Banks Harvest Callers’ Voiceprints to Fight Fraud, USA TODAY
(Oct. 13, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/
13/voiceprints-harveted/17207381/.
47
See id.
48
See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:45.
49
See id.
50
See Google Voice & Audio History, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
websearch/answer/6030020 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
51
See id.
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Finally, the private sector is also using biometrics for advertising. Digital billboards can use facial recognition to identify a viewer’s gender, age, and ethnicity.52 For example, an advertising campaign in London only displayed advertisements to women who
looked at the billboard.53 The ability to use biometrics for advertising is an emerging field, with some companies exploring how they
can use social media photographs to identify an individual in the
real world.54
Use of biometrics has become much more expansive in recent
months, and it is likely that the private sector will devise further
uses for biometrics. Such pervasive and widespread uses reduce the
effectiveness of human attributes for security purposes, exposing
the data to more system vulnerabilities. It also degrades the value
of the characteristics as security identifiers. Suddenly the private
sector values fingerprints, eyes, voices, and faces more significantly
than the individuals do.
C. Commodification and Other Risks
Biometrics share many similarities with personal information,
and the problems plaguing information privacy and security are also relevant concerns for biometrics. Personal information has been
commodified; it is now a type of good that can be exchanged for
something else.55 Two factors that significantly contributed to the
commodification of personal information were technology and the
private sector. Technology changed the way information is collected, used, and stored. Personal information, which was once difficult to acquire and process, has been made significantly easier to
access by advances in technology. The ease of information flow was
52

See Michael Fitzpatrick, Advertising Billboards Use Facial Recognition to Target
Shoppers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
media/pda/2010/sep/27/advertising-billboards-facial-recognition-japan.
53
See Erica Ho, Face-Recognizing Billboard Shows Ad to Women Only, TIME (Feb. 23,
2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/02/23/face-recognizing-billboard-shows-ad-towomen-only/.
54
See Chris Strohm, Facial Recognition on Facebook to IPhone Awaits U.S. Code,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1216/facial-recognition-on-facebook-to-iphone-awaits-u-s-code.html (discussing Redpepper
facial recognition application).
55
See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2069 (2004).
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exacerbated by the private sector sharing and aggregating information.
An example of this downward spiral is the Social Security number. Social Security numbers were never intended as a general use
identifier.56 However, because everyone has one, the government
and the private sector have adopted it as an identifier.57 As more
institutions adopted the number, it became less effective as a password.58 Technology sped up dispersal of the numbers.59 Today, the
Social Security number is considered the most valuable piece of
information to a criminal because it is a “skeleton key” for all accounts.60
Given how the private sector and technology spurred the commodification of social security numbers, extensive industry use of
biometrics also commodifies human characteristics. Despite using
biometrics for years, technology has automated the process and
allowed for the storage and processing of more characteristics than
were possible before. Recent private sector uses show how these
characteristics are being collected and used at an alarming rate.61
As is occurring with personal information, companies are collecting
biometrics in exchange for goods and services, or even without the
knowledge of the individuals. This leaves individuals without the
power to choose how to control their own biometrics. The private
sector’s behavior is propelling the widespread use of biometrics,
which reduces their effectiveness for security. Further, commodification exacerbates existing problems and risks associated with biometrics.
While some problems are the result of information privacy generally, biometrics also carry their own unique set of risks. The most
significant risk with using biometrics is that the characteristics are
56

See Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69(2) SOC. SECURITY
BULL., 55, 67, (2009) available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2
p55.pdf.
57
See id.
58
See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4
(2008).
59
See id. at 5.
60
See id. at 4, 10.
61
See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.
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irreplaceable.62 Currently, if a database is hacked, an individual can
change her password or request a new credit card. However, if the
system uses biometric verification for its security and the database
is compromised, she cannot change or replace her fingerprint, eye,
face, or other characteristics.63 Another concern is that biometrics
cannot be stored anonymously because they are, by their nature,
identifying information.64 The ability to link a person to data is a
critical privacy issue and central to existing privacy regulations.65
Finally, unlike passwords which must remain secret to be effective,
many biometrics are publicly accessible and can be captured without an individual knowing. Individuals leave their fingerprints on
countless items every day, and their faces and voices are shared
with those around them. The availability of the characteristics minimizes their effectiveness for security.66
Another risk associated with biometrics is that there is no adequate legal structure to govern the technology. As use of biometrics
expands, proponents of the technology praise it as reliable and foolproof.67 However, they are focused on the benefits without considering the consequences that will result when the technology
fails.68 Privacy scholar Daniel Solove calls this the “Titanic Phenomenon.”69 Builders of the Titanic were so confident of its unsin62

See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 202.
That is not to say it is impossible with advancements in transplant science. However,
if these types of transplants were to become possible, it seems an extreme measure to take
when a biometric system is compromised. Further, the ability to replace characteristics
dilutes the argument that biometrics are more secure than passwords.
64
See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics,
12168/02/EN, WP 80, at 5 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf.
65
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New Concept
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011).
66
See Sethi, supra note 3, at 127–28 (describing covert collection of biometrics,
including facial recognition).
67
See, e.g., Hu, supra note 6, at 1477–78; Biometric Identifiers and the Modern Face of
Terror: New Technologies in the Global War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairperson of Subcomm. on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information) (“Biometric identifiers are the
most secure and convenient way to authenticate and identify people because they cannot
be borrowed, stolen, forgotten or forged.”).
68
See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 199.
69
See id.
63
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kability that they did not have enough lifeboats when the ship
sank.70 Solove believes the same is true of biometrics: proponents
view the technology as infallible, but biometric systems will fail
and, when they do, there will not be adequate safeguards.71 Perhaps
the risk of biometrics failing was less significant a year or more ago,
or that fewer individuals and institutions would be affected if a
biometric system did fail. However, the private sector’s increased
use of biometrics has reached a critical point. If there once was
time to develop the technology and educate the public, the rapid
implementation of biometric systems has taken all that time away.
Instead, a flawed technology is being implemented and the public
has misconceptions of its reliability. The reach of biometrics now
ensures that should a system fail, or should an individual’s characteristic be compromised, the effects will be extensive and disastrous. Solove does not propose preventing the use of biometrics
completely, merely that society prepare itself and build proper legal
protections.72 One way to accomplish this is to consider the private
sector’s commodification and explore whether there is any way to
justify intervention.
II. JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION: COMPETING THEORIES OF
COMMODIFICATION
As discussed in the previous section, commodification aggravates risks associated with biometrics. This Part examines competing commodification theories and concludes that intervention in
the emerging biometric market is justified. The first critique considers economic theory, which supports unrestricted transfers of
biometrics, and points to market failure as an argument against
trading biometrics. The second critique examines the personality
theory, which opposes commodified biometrics because they harm
personhood, and suggests the concept of “market-inalienable”
where only monetized versions of biometrics are forbidden.

70
71
72

See id.
See id. at 201–02.
See id. at 203.
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A. Biometrics as Market Transactions
Economics is concerned with efficiency. The basic definition of
efficiency is Pareto efficiency, which exists in a voluntary market
transaction where both parties benefit from the transaction.73 Law
and economics scholars have applied economic theory to nonmarket behavior, creating a metaphorical market in which everything
becomes a market transaction.74 This approach treats human
attributes, relationships, and social interactions as commodities.75
Such an expansive view of tradable goods stems from Hobbes who
believed that any part of a person that someone else needs, wants,
or values is something with a price.76 This unrestricted choice of
what goods to trade promotes autonomy.77 Such a system of voluntary transfers is presumptively efficient.78
The economic approach sees biometrics as salable or tradable.
This approach equates a fingerprint with a bar of soap or a bottle of
soda; identities reduced to nuts and bolts. Companies currently
provide goods and services in exchange for an individual’s personal
information.79 Similar biometric exchanges are already occurring,
with companies trading services for characteristics.80 There is also
a growing reliance on biometrics for security.81 Using biometrics
for these purposes creates a market for human attributes and identities. Individuals and companies are suddenly placing a monetary
value where there previously was none. A biometric would be
traded to whoever values it the most. Economic theory supports
these voluntary exchanges so long as they lead to efficient outcomes.
73

See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 189–90 (2004).
74
See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–14 (1976)
(applying an economic analysis to nonmarket behavior).
75
See generally id. (arguing that discrimination, marriage, and children are market
transactions).
76
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 67 (Oxford Univ. Press 1929) (1651).
77
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13–15 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2002)
(1962) (arguing that private economic activity in a free market creates economic
freedom).
78
See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 190.
79
See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2069.
80
See supra Part I.B.
81
See id.
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Pareto efficiency depends on ideal circumstances, such as when
parties to a transaction are rational, well informed, and operate in a
competitive market.82 However, “market failure” occurs in the
absence of such ideals, when the market is no longer efficient.83 Indicia of market failure include externalities, public goods, information asymmetries, and cognitive limitations.84 Economists argue
that when markets fail, intervention is necessary to remedy the parties’ misaligned incentives.85 Government regulation is a common
example of market intervention, but the reform could be any force
that changes the behavior of parties in the market.86
Many privacy scholars argue that information privacy suffers
from market failure.87 The following sections will use these arguments to draw comparisons between personal information and
biometrics. These sections demonstrate that, just as with information privacy, biometrics suffer from market failure.
1. Externalities
It may not always be possible for an individual to fully assess all
the costs and benefits of a transaction.88 Some transactions have
implications for society that are not fully realized when an individual pursues her own self-interest.89 In such a transaction, the individual’s cost is less than the true cost to society.90 She pursues
transactions that look good because they do not account for the ac82

See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION
11, 11 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
83
See id.; THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 31 (2004).
84
See MICELI, supra note 83, at 31–32; Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1834 (2013).
85
See Stiglitz, supra note 82, at 13.
86
See id. at 22 n.2 (considering taxation and tort law as types of market-curing reform).
87
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2076; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_dat
a_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf; David L. Baumer et al., Tit for Tat in Cyberspace:
Consumer and Website Responses to Anarchy in the Market for Personal Information, 4 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 217, 242 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000).
88
See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 117.
89
See id.
90
See MICELI, supra note 83, at 31.
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tual cost of her actions.91 The individual cannot internalize all the
costs, and thus imposes some costs—or “negative externalities”—
on others.92
Negative externalities exist when an individual’s privacy choices impose harms upon others.93 An individual could choose to disregard her own privacy by sharing her biometrics with collecting
companies. She believes she will benefit from the convenience and
safety of using biometrics, and foresees the only potential costs as
risking her own data. However, her choice supports questionable
business methods.94 If a company utilizes databases or shares individuals’ biometrics, then her choice to enroll in its system supports
practices that can harm others. Likewise, she will be supporting the
use of biometrics as a security tool, which could become perverse
the more widely it is used.
Similarly, when a company chooses to utilize biometrics, it
harms individuals enrolled in the system. A company that decides
to implement a biometric system considers the benefits of added
security and reduced fraud. However, the company fails to consider the costs imposed on its customers. An individual may not have
a choice whether to withhold her biometric, preventing her from
making her own privacy decisions. Further, enrollment exposes an
individual to unnecessary security risks, forcing her to rely on a
vulnerable and irreplaceable security measure. The individual bears
the cost, which is external to the company. The company has no
incentive to minimize or properly safeguard its use of the technology.
A company collecting biometrics also imposes costs on individuals beyond its own customer base. If a biometric system is compromised, it could cause a ripple effect throughout biometric systems used by other companies because the same characteristic may
be enrolled in multiple systems. Individuals in those other systems
are harmed, even if they are not enrolled in the hacked system.
91

See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 117.
See id.
93
See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 445 (2011).
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Even where individuals or companies attempt to take precautions,
they will be harmed by others who are not as cautious when they
use biometrics.
2. Public Goods
A public good is something that is inexhaustible (when consumption of the good by one person does not reduce the available
quantity for others) and nonexclusive (when no one can be denied
consumption of the good, even if he did not pay for the good).95
When nonpaying individuals consume public goods, they create the
“free rider problem.”96 Failure to exclude the nonpayers causes a
good to be overused or degraded.97 This creates negative externalities because the nonpayer does not experience the full cost of its
actions.98 Often cited examples of public goods include clean air,
public parks, and national defense.99
Information is also a public good.100 It is either difficult or inefficient to exclude others from having a piece of information, and
once it is paid for it can be used and transferred at no cost.101 Biometric data is a type of information—whether in the form of data
or as a permanent human characteristic—and thus is a public good.
Providing a biometric to one company does not preclude an individual from sharing the same biometric with many other companies. Also, as previously discussed, biometrics are often freely
available to the public.102 Society benefits from social interaction
and the ability to recognize others. The only way to prevent the
sharing of biometrics would be to live in isolation.
Biometric collectors may also be nonpayers. Because many characteristics can be collected at a distance, companies may capture
95

See MICELI, supra note 83, at 32.
See id.
97
See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 124.
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See id.; supra Part II.A.1.
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See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2084; Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating CyberSecurity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1527 (2013).
100
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth
Century Economics, 92 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1448 (2002); Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M.
Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 553, 559 (1999).
101
See Stiglitz, supra note 100, at 1448.
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biometrics without an individual’s knowledge. Further, companies
may use the same biometric in nonrivalrous ways.103 In fact, it
would be inefficient for every company to collect the same information, thus incentivizing the sharing of biometrics. The more companies that use a characteristic, the less valuable that characteristic
will be for security purposes. Individuals, unable to exclude such
companies, will be harmed by a company’s choice to use their biometrics.
3. Information Asymmetries
Inefficiency can stem from information asymmetry—the scenario where the information available to the transaction parties is very
different.104 The imbalance may occur when information is withheld, misrepresented, or too costly to uncover.105 While information asymmetries are common, that one party merely has more information than another party is not the critical problem.106 Rather,
inefficiencies arise where the information disparity has a negative
effect on the parties’ negotiations and the functioning of the market.107
In the personal information market, information asymmetries
exist between collectors and the individuals whose information is
collected.108 First, individuals are often unaware that their information is being collected.109 Second, even if an individual is aware, she
does not know how the information may be used or if it will be
shared.110 Many individuals also lack an understanding of how privacy and security are affected by technology.111
103
See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Private Versus Social Incentives in Cybersecurity: Law and
Economics, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 13, 21 (Mark F. Grady &
Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (discussing cybersecurity information as a public good).
104
See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 171–72.
105
See id.
106
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1997).
107
See id.
108
See Netanel, supra note 87, at 476; Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2080.
109
See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2078.
110
See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 15, 17
(Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006).
111
See id. at 24.
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The same disparities occur with the collection of biometrics.
Some biometrics can be captured without an individual’s knowledge. A fingerprint can be lifted from another object, gait can be
recorded from a distance, and face and voice samples are easily
captured by cameras, phones, and other devices. Even if an individual consents to the collection, the processing of that information
may be unknown. For example, the banks collecting voice samples
did not disclose all relevant information to their customers. While
the bank provided a warning that calls may be recorded, the notice
did not specify that the voice samples are processed into voiceprints, or that the bank may share the voiceprint with other companies.112
Collectors are not incentivized to be forthright. Rather, companies use vague privacy policies and terms of service that do not accurately explain the company’s practices.113 A company often reserves the right to change its policy or terms at any time and without notice.114 If individuals had all relevant information, they may
not choose to freely trade their biometrics. As such, information
asymmetries in a biometric market lead to inefficiencies.
4. Cognitive Limitations
Economic theory assumes that humans are rational actors who
make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty.115 Individuals are
presumed to be forward-looking “utility maximizers.”116 However,
behavioral economists argue that humans err, causing significant
harms and leading to market failure and inefficiency.117 Common
cognitive mistakes include time inconsistencies, ignoring shrouded
attributes, unrealistic optimism, and difficulty assessing risk.118
Economists believe that humans consider both the short-term
and long-term costs and benefits.119 However, studies have found
112
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that humans are impulsive and have difficulty accounting for the
future.120 Humans have a tendency to place more weight on the
present than the future.121 These judgment errors cause individuals
to make choices with short-term benefits without considering the
long-term costs, and vice-versa.122 When faced with a privacy decision, individuals often accept whatever terms a collector proposes
in exchange for personal information.123 Individuals will make the
same errors when confronted with a decision about providing biometrics. An individual will be more concerned with gaining access
to a service than with considering the consequences to her identity
if the biometric system is compromised in the future.
Studies have also shown that humans are only able to pay attention to a limited number of things, and items that are inconspicuous
often get ignored.124 Even if the hidden items—“shrouded
attributes”—are important, humans are prone to ignore them,
sometimes to their detriment.125 Even if they do not ignore
shrouded costs or benefits, humans may undervalue them or fail to
recognize them until the future.126 These human errors are highlighted in privacy decision making, where the costs and benefits
are complex and frequently bundled with other items.127 Individuals have difficulty processing all the relevant information and instead rely on simplified models.128 The same occurs when biometrics are part of a transaction. A person may not see or consider factors such as if the characteristic is stored or disclosed. Using limited information, particularly excluding such important items,
leads an individual to suboptimal decisions regarding her biometrics.
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Another cognitive mistake is that humans are unrealistically optimistic.129 Humans tend to downplay bad news, preventing them
from taking precautions against serious harms.130 An individual
faced with the choice about providing her biometric may weigh the
promised security against potential disclosures. Collectors may also
be faced with the same situation, where they must choose whether
to implement a biometric system. A company may mispredict the
dangers involved with utilizing the technology.
Finally, evidence suggests that humans are poor risk assessors.131 Decisions are often based on emotions and heuristics.132 An
individual will consider immediately available knowledge without
further investigation.133 This practice leads to miscalculating the
probability of certain outcomes, either overestimating or underestimating the risk.134 An individual faced with a choice about biometrics will not likely have available examples or knowledge to rely
upon. As an emerging consumer technology, most individuals are
unfamiliar with how the technology works or the dangers it poses.
B. Personhood and Market-Inalienability
Opposite to economic theory is Margaret Radin’s personality
theory, which focuses on the importance of identity and preserving
the integrity and continuity of the self.135 She views entitlements,
rights, or attributes on a continuum from fungible to personal,
based on how connected it is to personhood; the more personal, the
more the entitlement should be protected.136 When something is
significant to personhood, loss of that thing will cause pain that
cannot be relieved even by replacing the item.137 This is because
personhood depends on the expectation of continuity, where an
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individual anticipates something to be part of her future self.138 Radin notes that bodies are literal components of personhood.139 She
believes that the concept of “universal commodification”—that
personal attributes are monetizable and detachable from the person—undermines personal identity; instead, substantive characteristics of personality must be inalienable.140
Inalienability is the notion that something cannot be separated
from its holder.141 The term is often used for entitlement, rights, or
attributes that may not be forfeited, cancelled, waived, relinquished, given, sold, or transferred.142 The category of inalienability at issue here is salability—the extent to which an entitlement
cannot be transferred between buyers and sellers.143 Radin argues
that some things should be outside the market but not necessarily
outside of social interactions, a category she calls “marketinalienability.”144
Market-inalienability supposes that commodification is a continuum. Something does not have to be completely inside or outside
the market, but rather it may only be nonsalable in certain contexts.145 For example, human organs cannot be sold on the free
market but may be transferred by gift. Unlike inalienabilities that
cannot be separated from the person—social security benefits or
the right to vote—market-inalienabilities are not inseparable from
the person, only that the market is not the cause of separation.146
Under the concept of market-inalienability, Radin believes
things have commodified and noncommodified versions, and argues that it may be necessary to prohibit the commodified version
of certain things.147 Prohibition should be used when the market
harms personhood, such as allowing individuals to freely commodi138
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fy themselves; separately, it may be necessary to protect the noncommodified version of a good because it fosters personhood.148
Radin uses “love, friendship, and sexuality” as examples: commodification of these goods will degrade the person and noncommodification is morally necessary for society.149 She claims that the appropriate mechanism to simultaneously protect and foster personhood is regulation.150
Under Radin’s personality theory, biometrics are personal. The
pain of losing one’s identity, through a biometric system or otherwise, would be quite severe. Human attributes that allow others to
recognize each other are closely aligned with a person’s being, and
individuals identify themselves through these attributes. As such,
they are essential to personhood and warrant protection. However,
that is not to say biometrics are so central to a person’s being that
they cannot be separated from that person. That notion would
render biometrics inalienable. Humans cannot be restricted from
enjoying each others’ characteristics, many of which are accessible
and freely given away. Individuals interact with others every day,
using their voice, showing their faces, and touching things around
them. There is no way to prevent a transfer of that information.
The only way to make biometrics completely inalienable would be
to put all humans in isolation.
Therefore, Radin’s concept of market-inalienability fits biometrics well. Just as with emotions, bodily integrity, and other social
interactions, biometrics should be precluded from market transactions. Allowing a human attribute to be traded and monetized will
degrade personhood. Applying Radin’s theory that commodified
and noncommodified versions can coexist, only the commodified
version of biometrics should be prohibited. A noncommodified version of biometrics fosters personhood by promoting social interaction. As stated above, human attributes that make an individual recognizable are essential to daily life in society. Humans cannot
function in society without the ability to share their identities with
those around them. Therefore, a nonmonetized version, where
biometrics may be given away, should be protected.
148
149
150
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Radin notes that regardless of whether a market is efficient, intervention is still justified where there is a commitment to protect
things important to humanity.151 Restrictions on commodification
would take into account personhood and foster nonmonetized
identities. Therefore, some form of oversight and intervention is
justified in order to balance commodified and noncommodified
biometrics.
III. AVAILABLE LEGAL TOOLS
Privacy is handled, or mishandled, in a number of ways around
the world. As the Part II discussed, there is a need to govern biometrics in order to keep them from the market and prevent commodification. This Part considers the existing legal structures and
how they apply to biometrics. First, there is an examination of selfregulation, which dominates privacy in the United States, and how
the notice-and-consent structure fails to adequately protect privacy. Second is a review of current biometric legislation; specifically,
the strategies utilized in the United States, European Union, and
Canada. Finally, this Part considers choice architecture as a balance
between autonomy and government regulation, and argues that a
combination of disclosures, incentives, and light government regulation may lead individuals and industry to make informed and better decisions.
A. Self-Regulation
Privacy protection in the United States relies on selfregulation.152 Privacy self-regulation is based on the Federal Trade
Commission’s Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) of notice, choice, access, security, and enforcement.153 The cornerstone
to this structure is notice and consent, allowing many forms of collection, use, and disclosure to be permissible.154 This model assumes that individuals are rational and make informed decisions;
151
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however, as shown in the discussion on market failure, that human
construct is a fallacy.155 Consent is deemed essential because it preserves an individual’s autonomy.156 However, individuals are often
left with a binary choice: They must agree to provide personal information, or they will not receive the good or service. This often
appears to be a choice to an individual, but in reality there is no negotiating.157 Further, providing choices is not the same as protecting privacy.158
Notice is preferred over forms of government regulation because it is easy and cheap to administer.159 A collector often provides notice through a privacy policy or terms of service, and an
individual often has to affirmatively agree to the terms.160 However, there are problems with these notices reaching individuals.161
Even if an individual does receive a notice, studies show that individuals do not read or understand the policies or terms.162 Further,
particularly with social media or other accounts, individuals often
do not know how to change privacy settings.163
The shortcomings of privacy self-regulation will have a detrimental impact on biometric decisions. If biometrics are treated like
all other personal information, their collection and use will be governed by consent and privacy policies. Further, as more institutions implement biometric systems, individuals will be left with
fewer choices as to whether they must enroll their characteristics.
The burden is on the individual to make decisions that could have
serious consequences. Notice and choice do not protect individuals
from their bad decisions, nor do they incentivize collectors to avoid
biometrics or adequately protect any collected characteristics.
155
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B. Government Regulation
1. United States
Privacy laws in the United States are narrow, related to specific
industries and based on who is collecting information rather than
the nature of the information itself.164 The broadest legislation is
the Privacy Act of 1974, which governs the federal government’s
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.165 However,
there are a number of exceptions and gaps that preclude biometrics
from receiving protection.166 In fact, many federal agencies have
been granted the authority to collect, use, and store personal information, including biometrics.167 Notably though, there is no federal legislation directly governing the collection and use of biometrics by the private sector, nor is there comprehensive privacy legislation governing the private sector in which biometrics could fit.
There is some oversight available from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), which has taken on the role of enforcing privacy and data security.168 The FTC’s authority to regulate privacy
and data security arises out of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which allows the agency to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce.”169 However, enforcement is only based on
written privacy policies provided by companies. Furthermore,
there are no regulations or oversight of the security standards that
should be used in biometric systems.170 As the technology becomes
more pervasive, this lack of consistency will exacerbate the vulnerabilities of biometric systems.171 Individuals will enroll characteristics in weak systems; because the same characteristic may be
enrolled in more than one system, when the weak system is compromised, it will compromise the other biometrics systems as well.
164
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On the local level, many states include biometrics within their
definition of sensitive data or personal information under fraud,
identity theft, or breach notification statutes.172 However, these
laws are reactive—they address the information after it has been
breached or misused. A few states have passed very specific restrictions on the collection and use of biometrics. For example, four
states restrict collecting biometrics of children at school; however,
with the exception of Florida, the laws still allow collection with a
parent’s written consent.173 Another example is that New York
generally prohibits fingerprinting as a condition of employment,
but there are a number of exceptions for employees of state, municipal, and certain private industries.174
Two states, Illinois and Texas, have passed laws that specifically apply to the private sector’s collection and use of biometrics.175
Both state laws require an individual to be notified and consent to
the collection, and restrict the collector’s ability to sell, lease,
trade, or disclose the biometric without the individual’s further
consent.176 Illinois also requires that a collector create a written policy with retention guidelines whereby the biometric is destroyed
once the initial purpose has been satisfied or within three years of
the individual’s last contact with the collector.177 Texas does not
explicitly state any retention requirements beyond storage with
reasonable care.178 Finally, both laws provide remedies for violations of the statute: Texas imposes a civil penalty, while Illinois
creates a private right of action for affected individuals.179
It is unclear how effective either the Illinois or Texas laws will
be because many companies operate across state and national borders. It is also unlikely that many other states or the federal gov172
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ernment will pass similar laws. Ultimately, the inconsistencies and
lack of regulation will do little to dissuade the private sector from
upholding proper privacy or security practices with regard to biometrics.
2. European Union
European Union Directive 95/46/EC,180 which governs the
processing of personal data, also applies to biometrics. In a subsequent opinion, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party stated
that the use of biometrics indicates processing personal data.181
Therefore, biometrics “may only be processed if there is a legal
basis and the processing is adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed.”182 The opinion applies the principles of purpose, proportionality, necessity, and minimization to biometrics: it is a prerequisite to clearly define the purpose for which the biometrics will
be collected and used; there must be consideration as to whether a
biometric system is necessary and if the invasion of privacy is balanced by the anticipated benefit from using biometrics—the opinion states that convenience is not a significant benefit to warrant
the loss of privacy; only the information that is required for the
specified purpose should be collected; and the information may
only be stored for as long as it is necessary for the stated purpose.183
The opinion also requires that biometrics be used legitimately.
An individual whose biometric is collected and used must be aware
that her biometric is being processed and she must provide freely
given, specific and revocable consent.184 Further, the opinion seemingly precludes many private sector uses of biometrics by noting
that:
“Personal data are not goods that can be asked for
in exchange of a service, therefore contracts that fo180
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resee that or contracts that offer a service only under the condition that someone consents to the
processing of his biometric data for another service
cannot serve as legal basis for that processing.”185
The opinion notes that the security of biometric systems is a
concern because the characteristics are irrevocable and that the risk
of theft increases with the more entities using biometrics.186 Therefore, the opinion includes a number of technical recommendations,
including that biometrics should be stored as templates instead of
storing a sample or image of the actual characteristic; centralized
databases should be avoided and local storage in cards, tokens, or
other devices should be utilized instead; biometric data should be
encrypted; and the data should be automatically deleted when no
longer necessary.187
EU member states may pass local laws that provide more protection than the Directive.188 Germany’s Passport Act prohibits a
federal database of passport biometrics, and requires that passports
may not be used by other agencies for automated retrieval of personal data.189 This provides that biometrics may only be stored on
the passport chip and may only be used for border crossing security
purposes.190 There is also pending law in France to restrict use of
biometrics.191 The proposed law would ensure that biometrics are
only used for strict security purposes, such as the safety of individuals, property or information that could cause serious harm.192 Further, biometrics would only be allowed if the risks to security are
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high and if there is proportionality between the nature of the thing
being protected and the biometric technology used.193
3. Canada
Canada’s approach to privacy regulation falls in between the
extremes of the United States and the European Union.194 For
many years, Canadian privacy protection was directed at government entities.195 However, Canadian policy has shifted towards
stricter regulation. In 2000, Canada passed the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) which
protected personal information across all private industries.196
Quebec, and other provinces, subsequently passed more stringent
privacy laws.197
Quebec law includes rigid limitations on the collection, use, and
storage of biometrics. Under this law, biometrics may not be used
for identification or verification without express consent of the individual.198 The law stipulates that the characteristics collected
must be ones that require the individual’s knowledge and that the
number of characteristics is the minimum and necessary number
for the purpose.199 Further, the biometric data must be destroyed
once the initially stated purpose has been met or no longer exists.200
The Quebec law also imposes requirements and restrictions on
the use of databases.201 Prior to creation, a biometric database must
be disclosed to the Commission d’accès à l’information, and any

193

See id.
See Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, “O, Privacy” Canada’s Importance in the
Development of the International Data Privacy Regime, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 669, 674 (2007).
195
See id. at 674–75.
196
See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
(Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-8.6.pdf; McClennan & Schick,
supra note 194, at 671.
197
See McClennan & Schick, supra note 194, at 686 (discussing how Quebec and other
provinces have privacy laws “substantially similar” to PIPEDA).
198
See An Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology, C.Q.L.R.,
c. C-1.1, c. 32, s. 44, available at http://canlii.ca/t/lgvb.
199
See id.
200
See id.
201
See id. c. C-1.1, c. 32, s. 45.
194

862

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:831

existing databases must be disclosed as well.202 The Commission
reserves the right to govern how a biometric database may be established and used, as well as how the stored charactertics are maintained and destroyed.203 The Commission also reserves the right to
prohibit any databases and order that existing databases be destroyed.204
As this section on government regulation demonstrated, the
level of regulation over privacy and biometrics varies among jurisdictions. The European and Canadian approaches are comprehensive and strict; however, the United States is unlikely to pass any
similar laws. On the other hand, the United States has no adequate
system in place to govern biometrics. As the following section will
show, there is an intermediary approach that may be the most feasible solution for biometrics in the United States.
C. Choice Architecture
If self-regulation and government regulation are polar opposites, then choice architecture sits in the middle. Scholars Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler call this “libertarian paternalism.”205
This theory is based on behavioral market failures, which exist in
the privacy context.206 Paternalism is favored, but not necessarily
in the form of strict government mandates.207 Instead, the response
may be through disclosures, warnings, and default rules.208 These
structures preserve autonomy but lead an individual towards making the correct choices.209
Choices are often determined by how they are framed. One example is if an individual is considering a medical operation, she will
be more agreeable if told the success rate than the mortality rate.210
202
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This loss aversion explains why individuals are affected more when
faced with a tax than a bonus.211 Similarly, they are more sensitive
to price terms than nonprice terms.212 An example of this framework is cigarettes.213 Smokers know cigarettes are unhealthy, but
are more discouraged by the increasing tax than the health risks.214
Smokers who are heavily taxed may eventually quit, a decision that
makes them better off.215
One method of employing choice architecture is through default rules. Humans are propelled by inertia, and most end up
choosing the default rules or settings.216 Another means is through
what Sunstein and Thaler call “RECAP” or record, evaluate, and
compare alternative prices. Government regulation would govern
disclosure, not prices, to better inform an individual’s decision
making.217 Yet another means to lead individuals towards making
the right choice is through incentives. Choice architects consider
how to get the right incentives to the right individual in order to
influence decisions.218 Loss aversion seems like a powerful incentive on individuals, but it could be applied to companies as well. If
acquiring consent is cumbersome and costly, a company will be
discouraged from engaging in that particular collection and use.219
Choice architecture provides a set of tools that can be constructed in such a way to deter the use of biometrics. It may be the
most realistic solution available to govern biometrics in the United
States. As the following Part discusses, building a regime of defaults, disclosures, and incentives will allow both the private sector
and individuals to choose how to manage privacy and security yet
slow the commodification of biometrics.
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IV. DISCOURAGING THE ADOPTION OF BIOMETRICS
Ideally, the best way to prevent the commodification of biometrics would be to prevent their use all together. Individuals place
personal and nonmonetized value in their fingers, eyes, face, voice,
and other attributes. The use of biometrics by the private sector,
for a variety of purposes, monetizes the characteristics. The rapid
growth of biometrics has led to the commodification of human characteristics and greater overall risks in using the technology. Considering how self-regulation fails to adequately protect personal
privacy and government regulation is impractical in the United
States, this Part argues that the best solution to protect biometrics
is through choice architecture. A system of defaults, disclosures,
and taxes will not completely prohibit the use of biometrics, but it
will discourage companies and individuals from establishing and
using such systems. The goal is to buy time by slowing the adoption
of biometric technology in the hopes that more adequate protections and safeguards can be established. The following are a set of
principles and tools, organized by phase of the biometric process,
to guide the current transition towards biometrics.
A. Collection
Privacy is individualistic and varies between any two individuals. Therefore, it is critical to maintain autonomy and freedom of
choice with biometric privacy. This will be accomplished through a
strengthened model of notice and choice. First, there cannot be any
collection without expressly informing an individual that her characteristic is being collected and for what purpose. Simply providing notice that voice samples are retained or images are stored is
insufficient; the collector must warn that this information will be
processed and used for recognition purposes. Furthermore, such
notice must disclose the risks and vulnerabilities of using biometrics. The misconceptions of biometric accuracy and security must
be dispelled. Liability for failing to adequately notify an individual
will fall under the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair or deceptive
trade practices.
The next step is consent, which must be affirmative and specific to each biometric. The default should be to use means other than
biometrics, requiring individuals to opt-in to the collection. To ef-
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fectively construct an opt-in default, goods and services should not
be conditioned upon providing biometrics. Opt-in permission
forces an individual to consciously choose biometric collection. If
an individual makes the choice to enroll in a biometric system,
there should be sufficient and conspicuous warnings before the
enrollment takes effect.
Collectors must not use biometrics unless other means are considered insufficient for the stated purpose, and only resort to using
biometrics if absolutely necessary. If a biometric system does appear to be required, only the minimum amount of information
should be collected. Further, taxation should be used as a means to
incentivize individuals and companies. Taxing companies that collect and use biometrics would discourage the companies from implementing such systems. A tax would force companies to conduct
a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the tradeoffs were economical, and ultimately weigh whether the supposed security from using
biometric systems outweighs the tax. These tax costs would trickle
down to individuals, whereby they are charged a fee or premium to
enroll in biometric systems. Since humans are more concerned
with prices than intangible concepts like privacy, this tax will discourage both companies and individuals from resorting to biometrics.
B. Use
Biometrics should not be used for security purposes, but instead be limited to value-add or innovation uses. These purposes
are more consistent with society’s current acceptance of biometrics, as something personal and nonmonetized. The goal is to
promote a use of biometrics that enhances social interactions,
without stifling scientific innovation. Furthermore, use of biometrics for security purposes makes the characteristics and security
systems appealing to criminals. Since the technology is vulnerable,
the more biometrics are used for security the more likely it is that
the systems will be targeted and compromised. However, the
movement towards biometrics for security seems to be inevitable.
Should security purposes be a necessary use of biometrics, all
biometric systems should be used for multi-factor authentication
with two or more characteristics being matched simultaneously.
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This reduces the risk of certain types of attacks, such as spoofing,
and ensures that even if one biometric has been compromised,
hackers will have to expend a significant amount of resources in
order to attack two or more characteristics. Finally, any collected
biometric data should not be sold, traded, or disclosed. This includes sharing with other entities within the same industry. The
value of the biometric will be diluted the more places it is used.
C. Storage and Access
Centralized storage of information increases the risk of disclosure and breaches. To the extent the characteristics can be stored
locally instead of in a central database, the less risky it will be to the
collector and individual. To this end, there should be a tax on biometric databases. There must be a system that incentivizes companies away from centrally storing biometrics. The tax will also force
a company to evaluate if balkanized storage will be a sufficient, and
ultimately less risky method of storing the information. However,
regardless of whether the biometric is stored in a database or locally, the data must be properly encrypted to add a further layer of
protection. As with notice, the FTC may impose liability for inadequate data security under its authority to regulate unfair and deceptive business practices.
Additionally, it is important that biometric systems allow individuals a right of access. Characteristics change over time, and the
technology occasionally makes mistakes. An individual should have
the ability to correct the template. Further, an individual should
also have the ability to request that her biometric template be destroyed. For example, if an individual chooses to enroll in one
bank’s authentication system, but then chooses to bank elsewhere,
her biometric should not remain in a different bank’s system. Finally, the choice to enroll in a biometric system must be reversible.
There have to be available alternatives that allow an individual to
receive the same good or service without enrolling her biometrics.
CONCLUSION
With the help of technological advances and the private sector’s interest, biometrics are rapidly invading daily life. Fingers are
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more than parts of the body; they are they keys to an account. Faces and voices are no longer something only shared with individuals
nearby, but tradable goods with value to companies. The rapid
growth of biometrics is turning once nonmonetized attributes into
something that can be traded and sold. This commodification in
turn exposes the flaws of biometric technology, which will only become exacerbated as more systems are implemented. Worse yet,
biometric systems have inherent security flaws, and hackers will
always be knocking at the door. Proponents looking to utilize biometrics for security purposes are essentially handing identities to
hackers and leaving individuals with irreplaceable identifiers.
Without comprehensive privacy legislation, we are on the brink
of a biometric crisis. The private sector will continue to find new
ways to use biometrics, and the security systems that rely on that
data will become useless. Therefore, it is wise to be proactive and
structure a system of principles and incentives to at least discourage reliance on biometrics. The proposed set of principles and
tools in this Note will create hurdles in the race to adopt biometrics. Buying time to strengthen the technology and educate the
public may be essential to protecting biometrics. Ultimately, individuals, companies, and the legal system must be better informed
and prepared for when the technology fails.

